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LABOR LAW UNEMPLOYMENT COMPENSATION EFFECT OF VOLUNTARY QUITTING Plaintiff voluntarily quit working for defendant Novem-

ber 7, 1939, to take another job which he reasonably expected to be permanent,
but which ended in seven weeks because of a slack in business. He applied for
benefits accrued under the Iowa Unemployment Compensation Act during his
employment with defendant, to which he was entitled unless disqualified by
reason of his voluntary quitting. Defendant employer opposed the claim to
prevent charging of benefit payments against his fund. The experience rating
features of the Iowa act provide that the smaller the depletion in an employer's
fund, the lower his future compensation tax. Held, plaintiff is not entitled to
payments because of a recent amendment to the act 1 which disqualifies an employee unless the cause for leaving work is attributable to the employer. The
fact that the unemployment does not directly stem from the voluntary quitting
is immaterial. Iowa Public Service Co. v. Rhode, (Iowa, 1941) 298 N. W. 794.
The result of this decision is to bar permanently an employee from the unemployment compensation funds of any employer whose employment he has
voluntarily quit. Since this will tend to discourage the seeking of better jobs,
it is hardly consistent with the traditional notions of an employee's right to
work for whom he pleases. Both the umpire and the appeal commission contended that other provisions of the Iowa act indicated the legislature did not
intend the amendment to the voluntary quitting clause to have such an effect.2

1 The present statute reads: "An individual shall be disqualified for benefits:
A. If he left his work voluntarily without good cause attributable to his employer••••"
Iowa Code (1939), § 1551.II. The former law disqualified the worker only temporarily and did not contain the words "attributable to his employer." See 3 C. C. H.,
UNEMPLOYMENT COMPENSATION SERVICE 18025, 1T 1975 (1939).
2 This is the basis for the decision by the umpire and by the majority commissioners on appeal. Iowa App. Trib. Dec. No. 40A-978-CM (April 12, 1940); No.
40A-897 C (1940); affd. Comm. Dec. No. 40C-90 (1940), noted 3 C. C.H., UNEMPLOYMENT COMPENSATION SERVICE l 8 5 l l ( l 941).
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While one of the purposes of social security legislation is the promotion of stable
employment,3 the fundamental purpose is to entitle an unemployed worker to
benefit payments if he is unemployed without "fault of his own." 4 The duration of the benefit payments is measured by the amount of work previously done
for one or more employers, and the tax burden is passed from the employer to
the ultimate consumer. 5 This case and the legislation which prompted it cast
doubt on these original premises. This shift in opinion may be ascribed to the
refinement of unemployment compensation by the experience rating or merit
rating method of tax assessment 6 which permits a lower tax rate on industries
where employment is most stable. The theory of such ratings is that benefit
payments are one of the true costs of goods made by industries where employment fluctuates, so should be reflected in the price paid by the ultimate consumer
of such goods.7 In view of the direct correlation between benefit payments
charged against an employer's fund and the rate of tax to be assessed against him
in the future, it is not surprising that an action for benefit payments is beginning
to be regarded by employers as something in the nature of a personal action between the employer and employee. While in theory the benefit payments are
passed on to the consumer, the employer nevertheless is vitally interested in reducing the amount of payments attributable to him, since it affects his future
tax rate. The recent amendments to voluntary quitting clauses, typified by the
Iowa amendment, may be regarded as measures to protect this interest of employers. The principal case is the first decision by a court of last resort defining
the effect of an amendment requiring that the cause for quitting be "attributable
to the employer." 8 Formerly, the acceptance of an apparently permanent and
comparable job was clearly proper cause for quitting,9 while under the
8

3 C. C.H., UNEMPLOYMENT COMPENSATION SERVICE 1801I (1939).

4

It is substantially this policy which is outlined in the "statement of state public.

policy" which appears as an introduction to the act of nearly every state. See Iowa
Code (1939), § 1551.08. The inconsistency of this policy with the decision in the
case was urged by counsel in the principal case but rejected. See also LESTER and
KIDD, THE CASE AGAINST EXPERIENCE RATING 11 (1939) (Industrial Relations Monograph No. 2).
5 Raushenbush, "Unemployment Compensation Experience in Wisconsin," 28
AM. LAB. LEG. REv. 154 (1938).
6 The acts of 40 states include such provisions. Id. at 157.
7 Id. at 157.
8 The jurisdictions which require the cause to be attributable to the employer are
.
Colorado, Hawaii, Iowa, Massachusetts, Michigan, and Wisconsin. Hawaii and Colorado have apparently made no rulings on the amended clause. Michigan's amendment,
Mich. Pub. Acts (1941), No. 364, took effect only on July 1, but because of the
volume of employment in Michigan a decision may be expected soon. The Wisconsin
decisions are not in point because another provision of that act clearly disqualifies the
worker from the funds of any employer whom he voluntarily quits, regardless of the
direct cause of the unemployment. Massachusetts rules that an employee who is
disqualified by reason of voluntary quitting regains his eligibility when reemployed
gainfully. Massachusetts Unemployment Compensation Commission, Dec. No. 1225
Mass. A. (1940).
9 Yankey, ''Voluntary Separations," SouTH DAKOTA UNEMPLOYMENT CoMPENsATION COMMENTS 7 (Sept. 1940), 5 (Oct. 1940); Pa. Unemployment Compensation
Board, Appeal of Schrecengast, No. B44-5-20 (Aug. 2, 1938), and Appeal of Roth,
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amended proVJs1on it evidently is not. In the principal case, however, the
court need not have considered the voluntary quitting clause, because the direct
cause of the plaintiff's unemployment was not his leaving the defendant's employ
but the last employer's prospective lack of work. Where the voluntary quitting
is not the immediate cause of the unemployment, an approach in keeping with
the general intent of the unemployment compensation law would be to ask, "Is
the employee to blame for his being out of work?" To hold that the employee in
the principal case is to blame because he would still be employed if he had
stayed with the defendant looks beyond the immediate cause of the unemployment and denies unemployment compensation in every case of voluntary
quittal. Such a policy would encourage the employee to stay permanently with
his first employer, or leave at his peril. If the immediate cause of a worker's
present unemployment is not a voluntary quitting, the circumstances of his
leaving previous work should be immaterial even under the Iowa amendment.
In such a case, previous employment should only measure the amount and duration of the benefit payments, but should not determine the worker's right to
them. In deciding whether the worker is to blame for his unemployment, his
reasonableness in quitting a prior job is a material consideration, but under the
doctrine of the principal case the quitting could be deemed reasonable without
entitling the worker to benefits. Thus the decision is harsher than is necessary
under the amendment, and the amendment is based on a misconception of the
true policy underlying unemployment compensation legislation.
Louis C. Andrews

No. B44-12-L-237 (Sept. 27, 1938); New Mexico, App. No. 39-AT (May 15,
1940); New Hampshire, App. 8-A-40 (Feb. 14, 1940); California: Op. B 1455c-03
(Mar. 4, 1938); Michigan Unemployment Compensation Commission, Referee's Decision No. AB-1390 (1940). (See C. C. H., UNEMPLOYMENT COMPENSATION SERVICE, 1f 1975 under various states.)

